Agentic AI Defense: Decode-Time Provenance Binding for MCP

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

[Submitted on 22 Oct 2026]

Title:Agentic AI Defense: Decode-Time Provenance Binding for MCP

View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:Agentic AI systems using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through untrusted tool outputs. We demonstrate cross-modal trust laundering, in which instructions concealed in an email-signature image using least-significant-bit (LSB), discrete cosine transform (DCT), or metadata steganography bypass text scanners and enter a multi-agent workflow when decoded by a tool. To counter this threat, we propose decode-time provenance binding, which combines HMAC-authenticated trust labels with an MCP-maintained provenance ledger and context-taint tracking. The mechanism labels decoded content as untrusted and blocks critical tool calls influenced by that content, even when a compromised agent substitutes a valid trusted label. We evaluate the approach using a real MCP testbed with three steganographic carriers and 24 adaptive payloads. The undefended pipeline exhibits 100% attack success, while keyword and regex defenses each permit 62.5% of attacks. Our mechanism blocks all attacks (0% success), including adversarial label substitution across mediated agent boundaries. A four-component ablation validates the roles of decode marking, cryptographic authentication, lineage tracking, and sink enforcement. An audited trusted-promotion mechanism increases legitimate-task completion from 67% to 100% without compromising protection. The approach provides carrier-independent containment within fully mediated MCP execution environments. Code and data are publicly available.

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